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DURING the same depression which developed the elaborate Chandler Act,
simpler and more flexible reorganization statutes appeared in a dozen states.'
But while federal bankruptcy law has been constantly molded and reshaped
by litigation and legislation, the state statutes have continued unexplored.
The constitutional knots to be untangled before such laws can safely be in-
voked seem to have discouraged inquiry into their possible benefits.2 Yet
the fact that such statutes are a legislative response to a genuinely felt need
in corporate law should inspire searching examination of the barriers which
appear to block their use. If the problems raised can be solved, the flexible
procedure under these statutes offers to corporations untried possibilities
for readjustment of their financial structures.
Almost all of the statutes employ the basic pattern of the Delaware act,3
from which a few standard variations have been evolved. Under the Dela-
ware law, the reorganization provision is optional and can become operative
only by inclusion in the corporate charter in haec v'erba. Where it has been
added to the charter by amendment, its application is restricted to those who
became shareholders or creditors after its adoption. Initiation of proceed-
ings, which may be voluntary or involuntary, is not explicitly conditional on
insolvency. Any creditor or stockholder, as well as the corporation, may
propose a plan or apply to the court for a hearing on one. At the hearing,
participants may urge objections or modifications. If the requisite majority
accepts the plan, however, and the court approves it, it becomes binding on
all parties, including the corporation. The court is given the necessary pow-
ers for enjoining suits pendente litc and for administering and enforcing the
plan once it has been approved.
4
1. 2 COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 41, §6(8); D.. REv. COD (1935) c. 65, §2037
C§ 5(9)]; ILL. REV. STAT. (1939) c. 32, § 157.90c; Ind. Acts 1939, c. 18, p. 2S; L.%. GE:;.
STAT. (Dart. 1939) § 1143; 15 MicH. STAT. ANN. (1937) § 21.4 [§4(3)]; M:u . STAT.
(Mason, Supp. 1940) § 7492-54; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1929) § 32-179; N. Y. Soca Cony.
LAWv (1939) Art. 9, §§ 95-99; OIo GEN. ANN. (1937) § 8623-15a; WAsH. REv. STAT.
ANN. (Remington, Supp. 1939, 1932) §§3803-58; V. VA. CODE ANI. (1937) §3018
[31-1-6(h)].
2. Only one case directly involving one of these statutes has appeared. Wells &
Wade, Inc. v. Unity Orchards Co., 186 Wash. 198, 57 P. (2d) 1050 (1936).
3. Most of these laws are derived from the provision appearing in the Uniform
Laws. Uniform Bus. Corp. Act § 59, 9 U. L. A. 102. The original source is probably
§ 153 of the English Companies Act of 1929. See P. uam, Com xv..Y " Law (1938) 536.
4. The language of the Delaware statute is essentially as follows: "The Certificate
of Incorporation may also contain the following provisions, in haec verba, viz.:
",'Whenever a compromise or arrangement is proposed between this corporation and
its creditors or any class of them and/or between this corporation and its stockholders or
any class of them, any court of equitable jurisdiction . . . may, on the application in a
summary way of this corporation or of any creditor or stockholder thereof, or on the
application of any receiver . . . or . . . trustees in dissolution . .. , order a meeting
1443
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The essence of such statutes is the provision for compelling dissenting
creditors to participate in a reorganization approved by the requisite majority
of their class.5 By eliminating the alternative of cash payments to dissident
parties, the acts avoid the twin evils of equity reorganizations: nuisance
value auctions and premiums on cash contributions." This element of com-
pulsion, however, raises at the outset a question of constitutional validity.
7
The denial of an alternative cash share has been a common basis for invok-
ing the protection of state and federal due process clauses.
8 It seems clear,
however, that no cash shares need be provided where there are no mortgage
bondholdersY Moreover, in view of the safeguard provided by the require-
ment of judicial approval of the plan upon a hearing, the due process objec-
tion seems untenable even in the case of secured creditors.
10
Objections that such statutes violate the constitutional prohibition against
state impairment of the obligation of contracts appear at first glance to raise
a more substantial obstacle." But decisions involving state insolvency laws
have held that statutes limited in operation to contracts consummated after
their enactment are not unconstitutional.' 2 The broad doctrine that all con-
tracts made within the jurisdiction are subject to its laws has sufficed to rebut
of the creditors or class of creditors, and/or of the stockholders or class of stockholders
of this corporation, as the case may be, to be summoned in such manner as the said
Court directs. If a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the cred-
itors or class of creditors, and/or of the stockholders or class of stockholders of this
corporation, as the case may be, agree to any compromise or arrangement and to any
reorganization of this corporation as consequence of such compromise or arrangement,
the said compromise or arrangement and the said reorganization shall, if sanctioned by
the court to which such application has been made, be binding on all the creditors or
class of creditors, and/or on all the stockholders or class of stockholders, of this corpora-
tion, as the case may be, and on this corporation.'
"Jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the Court . . . to administer and enforce
DFL. REv. CODE (1935) c. 65, § 2037. The provision against retroactivity is contained in
§ 2035.
5. See Legis. (1935) 48 H~Av. L. REv. 1414.
6. See Colin, Reorganigation by Decree (1933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 225.
7. The constitutional problems are more serious in legislative attempts to bind dis-
senters than they would be where the same action was taken by equity decree. In the
latter case, law is regarded not as being made, but as being interpreted and applied. See
Colin, Reorganization by Decree (1933) 28 ILL. L. R~v. 225.
8. See Comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 116.
9. Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). But cf.
Harding v. American Sumatra Tobacco Co., 14 F. (2d) 168 (N. D. Ga. 1926).
10. In the case of mortgage bondholders, the objection seems to rest on contract im-
pairment rather than lack of due process of law. See Detroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-
Loveley Co., 257 Mich. 655, 663, 242 N. W. 227, 230 (1932). For a discussion of this
issue, see Rosenberg, Reorganization--The Next Step (1922) 22 COL. L. RFV. 14; Swaine,
Reorganization of Corporations (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 901; Colin, Reorganization by
Decree (1933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 225.
11. U. S. CoNsT., Art. 1, § 10. See (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1090, n. 6.
12. Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223 (U. S. 1863).
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the claims of impairment. 13 On this theory, therefore, the inclusion of a
clause limiting the reorganization statutes to prospective operation 4 makes
possible their validation.
Unfortunately, specific prohibition of retrospective application defers to
the contracts clause of the Federal Constitution 3 at the expense of corpora-
tions which may require just such aid to rid themselves of pre-statutory
financial burdens. The usefulness of the laws might have been enhanced by
omission of this express provision. Those courts which find the provision
essential to the statute's validity would doubtless imply the limitation; but
it can be maintained that those laws omitting the provision would validly be
applicable to obligations previously undertaken, even though such retroactive
operation amounted to contract impairment. Reasonable impairment has been
sanctioned by the courts with respect to permanent legislation covering spe-
cialized enterprises such as banks,1 building and loan associations't and in-
surance companies.' 8 Most often, reorganization statutes of this type have
ridden in on the coat-tails of general and comprehensive regulatory systems. 1
An analogy, however tenuous, can be drawn between such systems and the
detailed corporation laws.
Another argument to meet the objection of impairment of contract is the
lack of substantial prejudice to the creditor. It has been held that if a cred-
itor is eventually to recover virtually the full amount of his claim, the delay
and exposure to further risk suffered meanwhile do not constitute unreason-
able impairments of his contract rights.20 The same court has also used
this reasoning to justify retention of an interest in a bank by stockholders
while allowing their release from double liability. Whether this argument
must be confined to what, on these facts, the court calls "deferred liquida-
tion," or whether it can be extended to a thoroughgoing reorganization re-
mains an open question. The latter alternative seems indicated, however, by
so extreme a modification as release of stockholder liability. M1oreover, the
substitution of freely marketable securities for current account debts might
well fall within the inflated meaning given "deferred liquidation" by this
case.21
13. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
14. DEL REv. CODE (1935) c. 65, § 2035.
15. U. S. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 10.
16. Paine v. Fox, 172 Tenn. 290, 112 S. V. (2d) 1 (1938) ; Doty Y. Love, 295 U. S.
64 (1935).
17. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1934).
18. In re Lawyers Mortgage Company, 277 N. Y. 244, 14 N. E. (2d) 55 (1933).
19. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1934); Penn General Casualty Co.
v. Pennsylvania ex reL. Schnader, 294 U. S. 189 (1934).
20. Dunn v. Love, 172 Miss. 342, 155 So. 331 (1934), aff'd, 295 U. S. 64 (1935).
21. Cf. Newman v. Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank, 1l0 N. J. L 122, 193 At. 235
(1938); Paine v. Fox, 172 Tenn. 290, 112 S. W. (2d) 1 (1938). In the former case,
depositors were given preferred stock, to be redeemed as the frozen assets %vere freed.
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Most often, ho:wever, legislation affecting existing contracts has been held
valid as justified, by emergency conditions.2 2  The depression years have
swelled the lists of commercial failures to the point at which courts are will-
ing to accept the.position of the business cycle as justification for legislative
interference with contracts.. Statutory reorganization of realty holdings
according to the dictates of majority holders, for example, has been upheld
in New York.23 Since these are but ordinary business corporations, it seems
reasonably certain that the emergency doctrine is broad enough to cover re-
organization of other business corporations. The coincidence of an economic
-crisis with the transitional period between enactment of such statutes and
discharge of obligations created prior to them should provide all of the
necessary elements- for construing the acts as emergency legislation, at least
for a limited period, to the extent that retroactivity is necessary.
These issues of constitutional validity are overshadowed in complexity and
importance by problems relating to the geographical scope of such legisla-
tion. When corporations deal with non-resident creditors or hold property
.outside the domiciliary state, the effectiveness of the reorganization remedy
depends largely on whether it may operate extra-territorially. Delaware cor-
porations, for example, commonly do their business and hold their assets in
other states. The Delaware act is thus of little value unless it will bind non-
resident creditors in all situations and will extend to all property of the cor-
poration, wherever located. Whether the statute can reach the corporation's
out of state business depends on the body of doctrine built on the principle,
basic to federalism, that a state cannot give its laws extra-territorial force.2 4
Since foreign creditors who contract with a corporation within the state of
its creation are bound by the laws of that state, they seem within the undis-
puted ambit of the statute.2 5 When the corporation enters into contracts
which are made and to be performed in states other than the state of incorpora-
tion, however, there is greater doubt concerning the power to readjust such
obligations under plans accepted in local courts lacking personal jurisdiction
over non-participating foreign creditors.
When asked to give full faith and credit to decrees rendered under such
circumstances, a reluctant foreign court might nullify their effect through its
power to examine their jdisdictional scope.2 6 State reorganization proceed-
22. Under this doctrine, states may interfere with contracts, but the law thus made
must terminate with 'the 6enirgedcy and must be designed as a reasonable remedy for
the specific exigency. See Clark, Emergencies and the Law (1934) 49 POL. ScI. Q. 268.
23. NEW YORK REAL PRo~ia$yl LAW (1933) §§ 119-123; Schmaling v. Burling, 151
Misc. 47, 269 14. Y. ISi~p.'747 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (upholding Shackno Act); People by
Van Schaick 'v. Title &** fof'jage Guaranty Co. of Buffalo, 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153
(1934) (same).
24. 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) 52; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U. S. 347 (1909).
25. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) 1278.
26. Baker v. Baker Eccles & Co., 243,U. S. 394 (1917).
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ings should be classified as "quasi in rein." 27 The administering court exer-
cises control through its possession of the res-i.e., the corporate assets or
the corporate personalty-and, as in an equity receivership proceeding, obtains
jurisdiction over interested parties through service by publication. -3 The
generalization is common that an in rem proceeding concludes rights in the
res against the whole world. In many cases, however, this effect has been
confined within territorial limits on the ground that published service gives
notice only within those limits.29 Thus, where the res consists only of prop-
erty in the domiciliary state, the jurisdictional objection takes the form of
denying that constructive notice through published service will bind non-
resident creditors holding foreign obligations. But inroads have been made
upon this doctrine in equity receivership cases. A federal district court in
Illinois issued a decree of reorganization barring creditors from participat un
for failure to file within a certain time. The reorganization decree was given
full faith and credit by a Missouri court as a bar to full recovery in a suit
by a creditor on a judgment obtained before the reorganization.30 Although
notice of the court order was personally served on the creditor, the court
indicated that service by publication would have sufficed.31 In the case of
administration of a debtor's estate, then, an order was, in effect, regarded as
enforceable outside the jurisdiction of issuance because it was based on in
rem proceedings.
Where the corporation owns realty outside the state, the non-resident has
available the further objection that such property is not before the court.
Even if the decree is binding on him, it merely discharges his personal claim.
But where he has obtained a lien on the foreign property, his right may be
expunged only if the attached property is part of the res within the court's
control. A serious impediment to recognition of such jurisdictional latitude
in state reorganizations is created by the policy that a state may administer
property within its boundaries according to its own laws. In Clark v. 1Ii!-
liard,32 the Supreme Court held that the appointment of a liquidator in Iowa
under a local statute regulating dissolution of insurance companies must he
given full faith and credit in Montana, even as against Montana creditors who
were not served with notice. The effect of this interpretation was nullified,
however, by the further holding that the dissolution proceedings did not
embrace Montana property of the Iowa corporation. The distribution of
those assets was said to be governed by Montana law. The effect of recog-
nizing the Iowa decree, then, amounted to allowing the liquidator to sue
27. See GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1936) 414.
28. St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Spiller, 274 U. S. 304 (1927).
29. GLENN, 0c. cit. supra note 27.
30. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Lincoln Horse & Mule Comm. Co., 284 Fed. 935 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1922). Contra: Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 4 87 (1913).
31. See Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Lincoln Horse & Mule Comm. Co., 284 Fed. 955,
958 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
32. Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112 (1934) and 294 U. S. 211 (1935).
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without proceeding through an ancillary receiver. He was subject, however,
to the same levies by Montana creditors as could have been made against the
corporation before these proceedings were instituted.
In the 1Villiard case, the actual administration proceedings were thus re-
stricted in the name of preserving states' rights. Yet it would appear that
the need for expeditiously winding up such specialized enterprises as insur-
ance companies by equitably distributing the loss is far more compelling than
the danger to state sovereignty. Inasmuch as this decision circumscribes
such proceedings in a manner which largely destroys their effectiveness, ac-
ceptance of its general principle seems unwarranted if a position which per-
mits a broader view is equally tenable. It may be argued that since the court
established the basic premise that decrees in debtor administration cases look-
ing to reorganization of companies not amenable to bankruptcy must be given
full faith and credit, it may impose only jurisdictional limitations. Accord-
ingly, if the decree is binding at all upon those residing in the recognizing
jurisdiction, it should exert upon them the same effect which it exerts upon
residents in the jurisdiction of issuance.
Jurisdiction of the required breadth is not new to debtor-relief proceedings.
In the determination of venue in bankruptcy cases, administration has long
been facilitated by automatic subjection of the debtor's property, wherever
located, to the supervision of the administering court. 34 The same effect is
achieved in equity receiverships through ancillary proceedings. Similar juris-
dictional inclusiveness in state statutory reorganizations may be derived from
the reasoning of Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhard.3 5 From the premise that
the corporation was the creature of the state of incorporation, the Court con-
cluded that the corporation was subject to control by the source from which it
drew its powers. So viewed, a court's jurisdiction extends not directly to all
the physical assets of the corporation, but to the corporate entity. It is
through control over the corporation that a court controls the corporate prop-
erty, wherever located. Acts which bind the corporation under the laws at
home bind it abroad. Correlatively, it was held in the case that a discharge
secured according to law in the domiciliary state would discharge the cor-
poration everywhere. In the case of a foreign creditor, the link connecting
him with the statutes of the incorporating state is the corporate charter, for
"wherever the corporation goes for business, it carries its charter."30 Where
the reorganization laws are in the form of direct statutory provisions, they
become a part of the charter along with all corporation laws of the state.Y7
33. Baker v. Baker Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917).
34. Bankruptcy Act § 111, 52 STAT. 884, 11 U. S. C. § 511 (Supp. 1938) ; 50 STAT. 622
(1937).
35. 109 U. S. 527 (1883).
36. See Canada S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 538 (1883); Washington-Alaska
Bank v. Dexter-Horton Nat. Bank, 263 Fed. 304 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920) ; Jesson v. Noyes,
245 Fed. 46 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917).
37. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE (1930) 809.
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Where they are in the form of powers offered to the corporation at its option,
acceptance of that option is indicated by their express inclusion in the charter.
In either event, according to the Gcbhard case, the creditor is conclusively
presumed to have contracted in contemplation of such laws, since the cor-
poration is necessarily controlled by them.3 8
In view of the flourishing growth of the "bootstrap" doctrine,39 the ques-
tion -of whether the Gebhard view will prevail over that of Clark -.. lilard
may depend largely on the jurisdiction which the administering court finds
it is entitled to assume. In a recent case, where the issue of jurisdiction over
the subject matter was raised and litigated, one who received notice but failed
to appear was bound by the decision.40 This principle was further extended
to deny collateral attack under similar circumstances, where the issue could
have been raised in the original proceedings but was not.4 These cases
seem to indicate that if the administering court is willing to assume control
over out-of-state property, its decision on that question must be considered
determinative by foreign courts which recognize the decree.'
Whether administering courts will take this step depends on the strength
of the inhibition against extra-territoriality. If the reluctance to seek to
38. A somewhat weaker alternative theory binding foreign creditors has been spun
from the doctrine of constructive notice. To the extent to which notice of the charter's
contents will be implied, reorganization provisions included in the charter %%ill become
a part of each corporate contract. Attleboro Co. v. Narragansett Elec. Lighting Co., 295
Fed. 895 (D. R. I. 1924); Citizens & Marine Bank of Newport News v. Mason, 2 F. (2d)
352 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924); McCormick v. Market Bank, 165 U. S. 538 (1,97); (1926) 11
CORN. L. Q. 538. While the charter is clearly binding on the stockholders, however, its
binding effect on creditors is often limited to those provisions which conventionally appear
in corporate charters. Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566, 2S0 N. W. OR3
(1938) ; In re Interborough Consolidated Corp., 277 Fed. 455 (S. D. N. Y. 1921). Den-
ver Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 9 Colo. 11 (1,85); see Comment (1932) 30 Mxcu. L
REv. 934. In view of the comparative rarity of these statutes, it might be held that char-
ter provisions for reorganization appear too seldom at present to warrant inclusion with-
in that category. Moreover, statutes in a few states provide, in effect, that the corporate
articles shall not give constructive notice. See ILrL Rzv. STAT. c. 32, (1939) § 157.8;
1 DODD AND BAKER, CASES ON BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (1940) 463, n. 2. One can
argue, however, that the limitations in these statutes and cases merely prevent con-
structive notice of charter provisions outlawing particular contracts, whereas a provision
dealing with the rights of creditors in general is within the doctrine.
39. This doctrine means that once a court, after opportunity for litigating the issue,
has decided it has jurisdiction, the question is no longer open to collateral attacl, See
Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 959.
40. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938).
41. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 60 Sup. Ct. 317 (U. S.
1940), 49 YAi.E L. J. 959.
42. Accordingly, a non-resident creditor who obtained a lien on property outside
the state before institution of reorganization proceedings may preserve his lien only by
direct appeal of this jurisdictional point. Since he must be a participant in the original
proceedings and must perfect his appeal within a limited time, the risk that such reLr-
ganization proceedings might be upset is considerably diminished.
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extend laws beyond state lines springs solely from considerations of federal-
ism, it is now clear that strict territoriality is by no means demanded. in
recent workmen's compensation cases, the same problem of extra-territoriality
arose when employees, injured outside the state in which the contract for
work was made, brought suit in the state of contracting. With full recognition
that the laws were being enforced beyond state lines, the courts generally
granted compensation under their own statutes. 48 Where the law was optional
rather than compulsory, some courts placed the recovery on a contractual
level, reasoning that the parties included the law in their negotiations. More
realistic courts, however, refused even vestigial acknowledgment of this tech-
nical argument. Their decisions were set on the broader base of refusing to
restrict the operation of a law which the state has found socially necessary.4'
Further conviction is added by the Supreme Court's latest word on the sub-
ject.45 A Virginia statute regulating the writing of insurance policies was
upheld even though it resulted in the imposition of greater cost on foreign
corporations contracting outside the state. In justification, the Court declared
that the mere fact that state action might have extra-territorial repercussions
which were against avowed state policies was of no judicial significance so
long as the action taken by the state was within its constitutional powers.
It may be argued, of course, that application of the full faith and credit
clause to reorganization statutes may be denied in the name of local policy.
The constitutional requirement is subject to a well established exception
where recognition of the foreign statute on which the cause of action is based
would conflict with the public policy of the recognizing forum.40 In a recent
case, for example, a Massachusetts employee was injured in California while
working under a contract made in Massachusetts with an employer of the
latter state.47 In the suit in California for compensation, an attempt to import
the Massachusetts statute under the full faith and credit clause was frustrated
by the California court. Its argument was that application of the Massachu-
setts statute denied effect to the California act, and, to the extent that the two
acts differed, would nullify the duly authorized expression of California policy.
In maintaining this position, the court recognized that the Massachusetts court
43. See Hall, Extraterritorial Application of Workmen's Compensation Acts (1935)
13 CI-KENT REV. 114.
44. Compare Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, 214 Mich. 218, 183 N. W. 204
(1921) and Hulswit v. Escanaba Mfg. Co., 218 Mich. 331, 188 N. W. 411 (1922), with
Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106, 116, 170 N. W. 275, 278 (1919) and
McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley Co., 111 Neb. 609, 612, 197 N. W, 615, 616 (1924). In the
first two cases, the holding is based on the law of the place of contracting and is framed
in "conflicts" language. In the third case, there is a perfunctory argument in these terms,
but reliance is placed mainly on public policy. The last case completely abandons the
technical argument for the public policy basis.
45. Osborn v. Ozlin, 8 U. S. L. WEEI 677 (U. S. 1940).
46. See Nussbaum, Public Policy in Conflict of Laws (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1027.
47. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal., 306 U. S. 493
(1939).
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would have regarded its own statute as controlling if suit had been brought in
that state. The same attitude is evinced toward revenue 48 and penal42 laws fur
a somewhat different reason. One state will ordinarily ignore criminal convic-
tions in another, and its courts will generally withhold judgments of liability
for the taxes of another30 The reluctance to accept jurisdiction over such
questions is engendered by a desire to avoid possible embarrassment in inter-
preting the obligations owed to another sovereign by the latter's citizens. Com-
bining the desire to favor local policy with the antipathy for foreign penal-
ties, courts in the past refused to recognize insolvency proceedings in another
state. 51 If the reorganization statutes are regarded as essentially insolvency
laws, this attitude might be extended to them.
Recent decisions, however, indicate a tendency to constrict this exception.
In the field of taxation, dicta of a recent case leave open the question of
whether judgment in an original suit must be rendered by one state on the
basis of a taxing statute of another.2 - But the case holds that, regardless of
the answer to that question, suit on a tax judgnent obtained in the legislating
state must be entertained in the foreign court. 3 Likewise, criminal convic-
tions in other states have been recognized for some purposes.54 On the
whole money judgments are given full faith and credit regardless of the rec-
ognizing forum's disapproval of their underlying cause of action.0
.Moreover, legislatures have contrived to combat analogy to insolvency
statutes by withdrawing the reorganization laws from the atmosphere of
debtor-relief measures and embedding them in corporation laws. Unsupported
by a fundamental difference, however, this disgnise will not set the new acts
apart from the early insolvency laws. The discovery of a sufficiently sub-
stantial distinction depends on recognition of the corporation laws as a unified
regulatory system. Under this view, the reorganization statutes represent a
process of readjustment of financial structure rather than a system for dis-
48. See Freeze, Extra-territorial Enforcement of Re'enti Laws (193S) 23 VAs.
U. L. Q. 321.
49. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265 (l18) ; see Freeze, loc. cit. supra
note 48.
50. See Freeze, loc. cit. mpra note 48.
51. Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489 (1888); Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223 (U. S.
1863) ; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295 (U. S. 1847) ; Sattertliwaite v. Abererombie, 24 Fed.
543 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1885) ; Bean v. Loryea, 81 Cal. 151, 22 Pac. 513 (18,9). See Bailey,
Discharge in Insolvency and Its Effect on Non-Residents (1893) 6 Hnv. L. REv. 349
for a contemporary discussion of this problem.
52. See Milwaukee County v. White, 296 U. S. 26S, 275 (1935).
53. Milwaukee County v. White, 296 U. S. 268 (1935).
54. State cx rel. Salisbury v. Vogel, 65 N. D. 137, 256 N. \V. 404 (1934); State
cx rel. Anderson v. Fousek, 91 Mont. 448, 8 P. (2d) 791 (1932). In these cases foreign
convictions availed to rule out candidates for public office under local disqualification
statutes.
55. REsTATEMENT, Coxrcr oF LAws (1934) § 416. See Milwaukee County v.
White, 296 U. S. 268, 275 (1935).
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tributing assets to creditors. There is no basis for deriving from a process
of this nature the implications of disgrace or of penalty inherent in exposure
of an individual to insolvency proceedings.
The reclassification of reorganization statutes as corporation laws assumes
greater significance as a key to the problems raised by conflict with federal
bankruptcy legislation. The theory of the paramountcy of federal bankruptcy
legislation requires, broadly, that state laws within a field entered by Congress
remain in abeyance while the federal law is in force.5" If these statutes are to
remain active in the face of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, the most must be
made of gaps in this doctrine. That these gaps are various and frequently
available is the single generalization clearly apparent from the cases in this
field. The most effective techniques for defeating the formula are the "blind
spot" theory based on omissions and exclusions from the Bankruptcy Act,
and definitional arguments. The success of the latter has decreased with the
gradual widening of the bankruptcy power. In recent years, the area of
bankruptcy law has been defined to include no less than "the subject of rela-
tions between an insolvent or non-paying debtor and his creditors extending
to its or their relief." 57 Argument that state reorganization statutes restricted
to insolvency are essentially part of a system of corporate regulation or that
they operate on a contractual level is manifestly unconvincing unless the court
can be persuaded to overlook this definition. But even this inclusive descrip-
tion of the bankruptcy power need not create conflict between federal and
state legislation where no explicit requirement of insolvency appears in the
state law. The latter type of statute may be freely invoked by a corporation
which not only is solvent but contemplates no default in its obligations. A
corporation, for example, with prevision of future conditions might find advis-
able present changes in its debt structure. Similarly, the statute might be
used to modify inter-class relationships between stockholders.58
The remaining limitations on the state reorganization statutes relate to
procedure rather than validity. In initiating proceedings, greatest latitude is
allowed under the Delaware act. Creditor and debtor alike may propose a
plan. Moreover, regardless of who presented the scheme, either class may
apply to a court for a hearing on it. Insofar as such freedom permits involun-
tary proceedings, the statute approaches nearer to the bankruptcy borderline.
Counterbalancing this risk, however, is the efficiency gained by allowing the
56. See (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1090.
57. See Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.,
294 U. S. 648, 673 (1935) ; In re Merced Irrigation Dist., 25 F. Supp. 981, 987 (S. D.
Cal. 1939).
58. But cf. First National Bank in Albuquerque v. Robinson, 107 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A.
10th, 1939). This case invalidated an entire system of New Mexico "insolvency" laws
among which was a provision allowing reorganization, but limiting it to readjustment of
stockholding interests. In view of the unquestioned power to validate such changes by
legislation regulating amendment of corporate charters, it would appear that this section
of the statute would not have been suspended if it had been separately considered.
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proceedings to gather impetus from a number of sources. The advantage
becomes clearer in the light of the restrictions imposed by the Colorado act,59
which allows the corporation alone to propose a plan. Once the arrangement
is presented, proceedings can be advanced by creditors or stockholders to the
stage of a hearing only if they apply to the court in respective majorities.
Vith the initiative in the reorganization thus largely in the hands of the
management, the procedure is exposed to unnecessary delay. Even where
the corporation is anxious to work out an arrangement, it can use the oppor-
tunify implicit in this type of statute to draw out the proceedings within limits
which it deems prudent, in the hope that a change in business conditions will
alleviate the critical pressure. Having set rumors of reorganization afloat,
the management can retreat behind its exclusive statutory power to promul-
gate plans and work out an arrangement at a more leisurely pace than col-
laboration with creditors would allow. Before the impatience of the creditors
overcomes their inertia, the management can offer its plan in reliance on
application to the court as a further opportunity for delay. By leaving this
step to the creditors, the corporation gains the time that will pass before the
necessary majority is collected.
The purpose of vesting power to offer plans in the corporation's hands is
apparently to make these proceedings voluntary. The reasons for requiring
a majority for creditor initiative, however, are less evident. If the requirement
was aimed at augmenting the chances of a brief and successful courtroom
session by assuring a confidence-inspiring minimum of votes beforehand, it
defeats the essential purpose of the hearing - i.c., judicial control - by neces-
sitating an informal preliminary bargaining process with no judicial safe-
guards. 'Without sacrificing the voluntary nature of the remedy, greater
efficiency and more effective judicial supervision can be achieved by rephrasing
this provision in the language of the Minnesota act.c  Under that law, anyone
may propose a plan, but only the corporation, its receiver, or its liquidator
may bring the plan to court. Chances for putting through the reorganization
are enhanced by creditor participation in the drafting process, while delay is
minimized by placing the burden of proceeding to court on the corporation.
Since the management has exclusive power to take this next step, it will be
subjected to creditor pressure from the moment the plan is proposed.
Before the plan may be heard in court, notice as prescribed by the court
must be sent to all the interested parties. Here the elimination of alternative
cash shares raises an important due process issue. .Since the creditor's claim
is being scaled down and perhaps rendered illiquid, courts will carefully
scrutinize the manner in which he was notified of these proceedings. Service
by publication may not be enough. The "jurisdictional" question becomes a
constitutional one of due process.
59. CoLO. STAT. AxN. (1935) c. 41, §6(8).
60. Compare MINN. STAT. (fason, Supp. 1940) § 7492-54 with the Delaware Act
quoted in note 4 supra.
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Once the plan has been heard in court, it must be voted on. It is at this
point that the essential function of the statute comes into play. Under its
authority, the requisite percentage of favorable votes will bind the minority
to acceptance of the plan. Typical wording of the voting provision appears
in the Delaware law.61 Whether by design or by fortuitous draftsmanship,
the legislators have extended minority stockholders unusual protection against
the management. It will be noted that the prescribed vote is phrased not only
in terms of three-fourths of the value of all the shares, a quantity which
might well be embraced in one holding, but also as a majority of the nimber
of shareholders. That this device may be more than a weapon of defense
is apparent. By clubbing together, minority interests might defeat the statute's
primary purpose of eliminating opportunistic obstructionism. While the ma-
jority might combat this by splitting their shares among dummy holders, it
is questionable whether a court of equity would approve tactics which might
shortly degenerate into a contest of fractionation. This difficulty is easily
avoided by providing that the stockholder vote be in terms of voting power
of the shares.
62
A further problem is provided by the introduction of value as a standard.
The language of the statutes does not make clear whether the vote is to be
by classes where the arrangement affects several classes of stock.03 If securities
of different par values vote as one group, complex possibilities for maneuver-
ing are created. Assuming a corporation-with 2,000 shares of preferred stock,
par 100, and 10,000 shares of common stock, par 10, the preferred stock-
holders could dominate the reorganization by securing the support of 25%
of the common stock. The more the management trades on the equity,0 4 the
greater this leverage will be. A point can be reached where it will be profit-
able for the preferred stockholders to buy up the necessary percentage of
common stock and force through a plan virtually extinguishing that class.
Creditor support of the plan will obviously increase with the curtailment of
common stock rights. Faced with a reassuring vote, the supervising court
might fail to appreciate the degree to which such leverage was being exerted.
To the extent that the brunt of the reorganization is thus made to fall on
the common stock, this type of provision leads to a result approximating the
61. See note 4 supra.
62. MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) § 7492-54.
63. See note 4 supra.
64. "Trading on the equity" is a term used to denote issuance of securities bearing
a fixed return which the management hopes will be less than the return on the capital
which those securities represent. The excess so earned is available for common stock
dividends. For example, if a corporation issues $100,000 of 6% preferred and $100,000
of common stock and earns 10% on all invested capital, $14,000 of its earnings of $20,000
are available for dividends on common stock. The common stock yield is thus 14%, even
though the corporation earns only 10%.
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effects of the Boyd doctrine.es Under the Minnesota statute, on the other
hand, the same failure to clarify the voting procedure produces exactly the
opposite effect. Since that statute is phrased in terms of voting power, the
leverage lies with the issue having the largest number of shares, which would
probably be the common stock.
The extent of judicial supervision of these steps is suggested only vaguely
by the stipulation that plans are subject to approval by the court. From the
paucity of case material it is as yet impossible to derive any limiting general-
ization regarding standards which the courts will adopt. New York has
dearly adopted the Boyd doctrine in its administration of the realty reorgan-
ization laws.66 While the only other case in point0 7 seems to leave room for
inference that these statutes might be used as specific authority for evading
that doctrine, the Supreme Court's present attitude makes this development
unlikely. In view of the strong expression of policy in recent applications
of the principle, 68 it is conceivable that the Boyd doctrine may become a
yardstick for measuring the constitutionality of reorganization proceedings
in terms of the due process clause.
The problems and pitfalls of these statutes naturally narrow their sphere
of usefulness. Reorganizations of the sort which they can offer would be
attractive to a large corporation as a means for eluding the zealous watch-
fulness of the SEC! 9 But the extent to which large firms engage in interstate
dealings exposes them to numerous suits collaterally attacking such arrange-
ments on any of the grounds discussed above. It is true that courts have
indicated an increasing reluctance to overthrow settlements that have other-
wise come to fruition.70 It is likewise evident that risk of supersession by
65. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (U. S. 1939). For a discussion of the doctrine of strict
priority, see (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1099.
66. Chase National Bank v. 10 East 40th St. Corp., 238 App. Div. 370, 264 N. Y.
Supp. 882 (1st Dep't 1933) ; Rice v. Pounds, 153 'Misc. 226, 274 N. Y. Supp. 637 (Sup. Ct.
1934) ; Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon St. Corp., 237 App. Div. 799, 263 N. Y.
Supp. 359 (2d Dep't 1933).
67. Wells & Wade, Inc. v. Unity Orchards Co., 186 Wash. 193, 57 P. (2d) 1050
(1936).
68. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (U. S. 1939) ; Securities
& Exchange Comm. v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 8 U. S. L AV= 925
(U. S. 1940).
69. 52 STAT. 890, 11 U. S. C. §§ 572-574 (Supp. 1938).
70. Thus, collateral attack was denied where the attacdng creditor could have filed
an involuntary petition within the statutory period but instead sought to obtain a prefer-
ence through garnishment of the fund assigned under the state law. Boese v. King, 103
U. S. 379 (1883). In a later case, an attacdng creditor failed even though he could not
have filed an involuntary petition. Johnson v. Star, 287 U. S. 5.27 (1933). The develop-
ment of the "bootstrap" doctrine illustrates a further extension of this attitude. See note
39 mipra.
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federal proceedings 71 dwindles as they increase in complexity and expense.7 2
Nevertheless, the number of possible suits by non-resident dissidents alone
would probably overshadow the benefits from resort to these statutes where
federal proceedings were available. In a solvent corporation, however, these
statutes suggest a useful means for modifying stockholders '" rights or for
revising the debt structure where ordinary methods of refunding are unavail-
able or infeasible. 74
The statutes seem better designed to meet the needs of small, local enter-
prises whose property is generally within one state. When some ordinary
business misfortune causes financial stringency, it is not only to their best
interests, but to those of the community as well, that they be provided with
a means of reducing the pressure without losing their grip on the tangibles
and intangibles which constitute a going concern. Resort to the liquidative
process of bankruptcy would mean loss of the corporate assets and acquisition
of the unpleasant taint of "bankrupt." Chapter XI offers the only coin-
parable remedy, but its desirability is diminished by its inapplicability to
secured claims.
In view of the problems impeding their growth, there seems little likeli-
hood that these statutes will mushroom into systems competing with the
Bankruptcy Act. Uniformity of administration of debtor-creditor relations is
consequently in little danger. From the practical legislator's point of view,
moreover, an opportunity for small-scale experimentation is provided that
will test the feasibility of possible innovations in the federal law. Meanwhile,
the use of these statutes within their restricted spheres would add to the entire
system of debtor-creditor supervision the flexibility required for meeting
distinctly local problems.
71. See (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1090, 1098 for the argument that the Bankruptcy Act
recognizes the validity of state proceedings. Cf. Gallagher v. Keystone Realty Holding
Co., 333 Pa. Rep. 9, 3 A. (2d) 426 (1939).
72. As to the cost of reorganization, see Referee's opinion, Chase National Bank v.
10 East 40th St. Corp., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 2, 1933, p. 1, col. 7. The reorganization expenses
were $346,640.38. Appellant's brief (p. 48) estimates the average cost of reorganization
under the Schackno Act to be $3,000.
The risk of supersession is further decreased by the jurisdictional limitations of
Chapters X and XI, e.g., the insolvency requirements and limitations on the scope of the
plans with respect to securities affected. See also Rostow and Cutler, Competing Systems
of Corporate Reorganization (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1334.
73. The modification of stockholders' rights is ordinarily possible through charter
amendment; it is, accordingly, difficult to see the value of the New Mexico and Ohio
statutes, which do not extend to creditors but are limited to changes within the classes
of stock.
74. The problems facing solvent corporations are well discussed by Sargent &
Zelkowich, Reorganizing "Solvent" Corporations (1934) 29 ILL. L. REV. 137.
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